**The Benefits and Burdens of Nuclear Latency**

**Supplementary Files for Online Appendix**

***Corrected Figures***

**March 2018**

Due to an author coding error, the published version of the article contains incorrect versions of Table 2 and Table 3. The correct versions are shown below.

Table 2: Results Summary (Rare Events)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Dependent Variable* | *Direction* |  *Significance (p>|z|)* |
| Violent MIDs **–** Target (Model 1)Violent MIDs – Initiator (Model 2) | NegativePositive | Not SignificantNot Significant |
| U.S. Military Aid (Model 3)U.S. Economic Aid (Model 4) | NegativeNegative | Significant (\*\*\*)Not Significant |
| Compellent Threat Success (Model 5) | Positive | Not Significant |
| Violent MIDs- Target (Model 6)U.S. Imposed Economic Sanctions (Model 7) | NegativePositive | Not SignificantSignificant (\*) |
|  |  |  |

**Table 3: Effect of Latency on Dispute and Bargaining Outcomes (3 Year Lag; RELOGIT)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Model 1/6**(MIDsTarg)* | *Model 2**(MIDsInit)* | *Model 3**(Mil Aid)* | *Model 4**(Econ Aid)* | *Model 5**(Threat Success)* | *Model 7**(US Sanctions)* |
| *Latency (no NWS)* | -0.090 | 0.273 | -0.777\*\*\* | -0.014 | 0.902 | 0.551\* |
|  | (0.193) | (0.195) | (0.237) | (0.220) | (0.888) | (0.316) |
| *US NCA/123* | 0.276\*\* | 0.351\*\*\* | 1.201\*\*\* | 0.175 | 0.563 | 0.353\* |
|  | (0.101) | (0.106) | (0.125) | (0.120) | (0.689) | (0.197) |
| *Econ. Openness* | -0.002\* | -0.004\*\*\* | 0.003\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* | -0.001 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| *NPT Era* | 0.049 | 0.021 | 0.209 | 0.318\*\*\* | -0.375 | 0.362\* |
|  | (0.115) | (0.123) | (0.130) | (0.121) | (0.785) | (0.194) |
| *Regime Type* | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.003 | -0.020\*\*\* | -0.011 | 0.031 | -0.059\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.029) | (0.012) |
| *NPT Signatory* | 0.057 | 0.187\* | 0.499\*\*\* | 0.540\*\*\* | 0.232 | 0.607\*\*\* |
|  | (0.106) | (0.113) | (0.119) | (0.117) | (0.599) | (0.167) |
| *GDP Per Capita* | 0.000 | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000 | -0.000 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) |
| *Polity Change* | 0.001 | 0.023\*\* | -0.012 | -0.025\*\* | -0.095\* | 0.058\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.052) | (0.016) |
| *Rivalry* | 0.535\*\*\* | 0.788\*\*\* | 0.115 | 0.181\* | 0.522 | 0.703\*\*\* |
|  | (0.088) | (0.094) | (0.088) | (0.095) | (0.426) | (0.138) |
| *CINC* | 9.719\*\*\* | 1.917 | -3.206 | -6.664 | 12.964 | -6.851\* |
|  | (3.473) | (3.143) | (5.376) | (5.087) | (12.945) | (3.824) |
| *US Ally* | -0.309\*\*\* | -0.049 | 0.775\*\*\* | 0.589\*\*\* | 0.055 | -0.019 |
|  | (0.093) | (0.097) | (0.093) | (0.104) | (0.488) | (0.151) |
| *Borders* | 0.056\*\*\* | 0.061\*\*\* | 0.075\*\*\* | 0.034\* | 0.031 | 0.094\*\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.100) | (0.027) |
| *Time* | -0.225\*\*\* | -0.263\*\*\* | -0.876\*\*\* | -1.033\*\*\* | -0.047 | -1.029\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.043) | (0.062) | (0.112) | (0.085) |
| *Time2* | 0.009\*\*\* | 0.011\*\*\* | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.052\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.042\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.030) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| *Time3* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.000\*\*\* | -0.001\*\*\* | -0.000 | -0.000\*\*\* |
| *Constant* | (0.000)-1.533\*\*\*(0.117) | (0.000)-1.641\*\*\*(0.129) | (0.000)0.378\*\*\*(0.111) | (0.000)1.452\*\*\*(0.117) | (0.000)-5.568\*\*\*(0.117) | (0.000)-0.910\*\*\*(0.189) |
| *Observations* |  6,514 |  6,514 |  6,510 |  6,510 |  6,510 |  6,510 |
| Standard Errors in Parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |