My research interests lie in international security and conflict behavior, with a specialization in nuclear nonproliferation/counter-proliferation, extended deterrence/international institutions, nuclear latency, force structure, and deterrence and coercion strategy.
My first project examines the role of exogenous strategic influence, namely that of the United States, on incentivizing changes in nuclear decision-making. The core of this research project is my first book, Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (Oxford University Press, 2020), that explores the conditions under which states that have started nuclear weapons programs stop their pursuit as a result of pressure from the United States. Related work is also listed in Research.
In related articles and book project, my co-author, William Spaniel, and I examine how uncertainty over the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons impacts the likelihood of counterproliferation agreements across a variety of theoretical conditions and cases. We focus how the informational environment nonproliferation advocates face explains nuclear outcomes. The pieces of these projects are also described in Research.
Additionally, I have on-going co-authored research projects on nuclear latency or the precursor technology prior to nuclear weaponization. The first paper in the series that examines the effects of nuclear latency was published in the International Studies Quarterly. Related pieces on the Iran nuclear deal have been published in The Washington Quarterly, and in an edited volume entitled , US Foreign Policy in a Challenging World - Building Order on Shifting Foundations. Other papers, with Eleonora Mattiaci and Rachel Whitlark on nuclear latency explore its security and energy determinants, its impact on trust in the international system, and its relationship to counterproliferation policy, are all under review. The pieces of these projects are also described in Research.
My third project, with Neil Narang, explores how international institutions, including alliances, are impacted by nuclear technology. A first paper on extended nuclear deterrence and moral hazard was published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Another paper under review, examines whether allies of nuclear patrons are able to gain concessions through diplomacy. We are also currently working a book manuscript (The Patron's Dilemma: Recklessness and Restraint Under Nuclear Umbrellas) that explores the consequences of extended deterrence in the international system. Additionally, my research has begun to explore newer forms of disruptive technology and their impact on the international system. One article that explores the impact of emerging technologies on assurance and deterrence was published in the Journal of Strategic Studies. Related research on emerging technology, with Paige Cone and Noelle Troutman, and other projects are described in Research.
Finally, the newest branch of my research agenda explores the intersection of political neuroscience and international/nuclear security to understand how elites make decisions under risk and uncertainty. This research with Ingrid Haas and Geoff Lorenz (funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the National Strategic Research Institute) explores the neural underpinnings of strategic decision-making and behavior in foreign policy, with specific application to international security and interstate relations with peer competitors like China and Russia. This research also aims to unpack the important, but under-explored, neural and cognitive factors that may better explain how leaders pursue different approaches to foreign policy and the impact on key outcomes in the international system. The first paper in this research agenda (with Noelle Troutman and Ingrid Haas) is under review.
My commentary has been published in the Washington Post,War on the Rocks, International Studies Quarterly, Washington Post's Monkey Cage, H-Diplo, and DecodeDC. My research has received support from the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (the UC system), the Stanton Foundation, USSTRATCOM, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Senning Foundation, the University of Nebraska, and the University of California, San Diego.
My first project examines the role of exogenous strategic influence, namely that of the United States, on incentivizing changes in nuclear decision-making. The core of this research project is my first book, Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (Oxford University Press, 2020), that explores the conditions under which states that have started nuclear weapons programs stop their pursuit as a result of pressure from the United States. Related work is also listed in Research.
In related articles and book project, my co-author, William Spaniel, and I examine how uncertainty over the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons impacts the likelihood of counterproliferation agreements across a variety of theoretical conditions and cases. We focus how the informational environment nonproliferation advocates face explains nuclear outcomes. The pieces of these projects are also described in Research.
Additionally, I have on-going co-authored research projects on nuclear latency or the precursor technology prior to nuclear weaponization. The first paper in the series that examines the effects of nuclear latency was published in the International Studies Quarterly. Related pieces on the Iran nuclear deal have been published in The Washington Quarterly, and in an edited volume entitled , US Foreign Policy in a Challenging World - Building Order on Shifting Foundations. Other papers, with Eleonora Mattiaci and Rachel Whitlark on nuclear latency explore its security and energy determinants, its impact on trust in the international system, and its relationship to counterproliferation policy, are all under review. The pieces of these projects are also described in Research.
My third project, with Neil Narang, explores how international institutions, including alliances, are impacted by nuclear technology. A first paper on extended nuclear deterrence and moral hazard was published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Another paper under review, examines whether allies of nuclear patrons are able to gain concessions through diplomacy. We are also currently working a book manuscript (The Patron's Dilemma: Recklessness and Restraint Under Nuclear Umbrellas) that explores the consequences of extended deterrence in the international system. Additionally, my research has begun to explore newer forms of disruptive technology and their impact on the international system. One article that explores the impact of emerging technologies on assurance and deterrence was published in the Journal of Strategic Studies. Related research on emerging technology, with Paige Cone and Noelle Troutman, and other projects are described in Research.
Finally, the newest branch of my research agenda explores the intersection of political neuroscience and international/nuclear security to understand how elites make decisions under risk and uncertainty. This research with Ingrid Haas and Geoff Lorenz (funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the National Strategic Research Institute) explores the neural underpinnings of strategic decision-making and behavior in foreign policy, with specific application to international security and interstate relations with peer competitors like China and Russia. This research also aims to unpack the important, but under-explored, neural and cognitive factors that may better explain how leaders pursue different approaches to foreign policy and the impact on key outcomes in the international system. The first paper in this research agenda (with Noelle Troutman and Ingrid Haas) is under review.
My commentary has been published in the Washington Post,War on the Rocks, International Studies Quarterly, Washington Post's Monkey Cage, H-Diplo, and DecodeDC. My research has received support from the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (the UC system), the Stanton Foundation, USSTRATCOM, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Senning Foundation, the University of Nebraska, and the University of California, San Diego.